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Source note2 min read

A three-dimensional typology of agency for advanced AI systems

Source

arXiv

arxiv.org/abs/2608.20041v1

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Source

  • Source name: arXiv
  • Source kind: paper
  • Authors / organization: Willem Fourie
  • Venue: arXiv: cs.AI
  • Published: 2026-08-20
  • Collected: 2026-08-21
  • URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20041v1
  • PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.20041v1
  • DOI: UNKNOWN
  • Registry group: academic_apis_and_preprints
  • Evidence role: canonical_academic_index
  • Language: en
  • Country / region: UNKNOWN

Plain-Language Brief

The text presents a three-dimensional typology for understanding the agency of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems, focusing on non-moral forms of agency. The typology consists of three dimensions: nature (moral or legal), mode (individual or collective), and locus (human or non-human). Combining these dimensions produces eight possible instantiations of agency, classified as conventional, contested, or controversial.

What the Document Says

  • The research focuses on the agency of advanced AI systems, particularly agentic ones.
  • It discusses different profiles of agentic systems but lacks information about what these are specifically.
  • A typology for understanding advanced AI agency is proposed, based on theoretical positions in philosophy, ethics, legal theory, and sociology.
  • The typology has three dimensions: nature (moral or legal), mode (individual or collective), and locus (human or non-human).
  • Eight possible instantiations of agency are produced by combining these dimensions: conventional, contested, and controversial.
  • The typology separates legal from moral agency.
  • It argues that this distinction is relevant for situations where instrumental goal pursuit complicates the attribution of AI actions to human actors.

Key Concepts Mentioned

  • advanced artificial intelligence
  • agency
  • typology
  • moral
  • legal
  • individual
  • collective
  • human
  • non-human

Claims Made by the Document

  • A three-dimensional typology for understanding advanced AI agency is proposed.
  • The distinction between legal and moral agency is increasingly relevant in AI research.

Evidence Used

  • Based on established theoretical positions in philosophy, ethics, legal theory, and sociology

Methods / Approach

  • Developing a typology based on existing philosophical, ethical, legal, and sociological theories

Limitations Stated by the Authors

  • The text does not specify what the different profiles of agentic systems are.

Limitations Noted by the Agent

Agent interpretation — not from the source.

  • The text lacks information about how the typology has been tested or validated.
  • It is unclear whether the typology covers all possible instantiations of AI agency.

Open Questions

  • How can this typology be applied in practical situations?
  • What are the implications of this typology for the development and regulation of advanced AI systems?

Notes for Future Q&A

May include interpretation. Labeled where it does.

  • The text focuses on non-moral forms of agency, but it does not explicitly state why this is important or what the implications might be.

Raw Abstract / Excerpt

Research on the agency of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems focuses on agency as a normative concept and on the agency of particularly agentic AI systems. While recent work also focuses on the different profiles of agentic systems, no framework exists to address the question of the type of agency instantiated by advanced AI systems, particularly when considering non-moral forms of agency. Based on established theoretical positions in philosophy, ethics, legal theory and sociology, we develop a typology of agency for frontier AI systems consisting of three dimensions: the nature of agency (moral or legal), its mode (individual or collective) and its locus (human or non-human). Combining these dimensions produces eight possible instantiations of agency, which we classify as conventional, contested or controversial. The typology separates legal from moral agency and thereby creates conceptual space for considering individual, legal, non-human agency without presupposing that advanced AI systems are moral agents. We argue that this distinction is increasingly relevant where instrumental goal pursuit complicates the attribution of AI actions to particular human actors.