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SolarChain-Eval: A Physics-Constrained Benchmark for Trustworthy Economic Agents in Decentralized Energy Markets

Source

arXiv

arxiv.org/abs/2607.08681v1

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Plain-Language Brief

The paper proposes SolarChain-Eval, a benchmark for evaluating the trustworthiness of economic agents in decentralized energy markets. The benchmark is designed to assess the performance of AI systems in cyber-physical environments and ensures they do not exploit invalid data or produce unstable governance decisions.

What the Document Says

  • The text discusses a proposal for SolarChain-Eval, a benchmark that evaluates trustworthy economic agents in decentralized energy markets.
  • It formulates market governance as a Gymnasium-compatible Markov Decision Process.
  • Agents make hourly decisions and are evaluated across multiple dimensions such as market utility, physical safety, slippage, action smoothness, spatial fairness, and auditability.
  • SolarChain-Eval incorporates an LLM-based Planner/Auditor layer for evaluation.
  • The Planner defines episode-level action bounds and audit rules, while the Auditor reviews and revises high-risk actions.
  • Experiments were conducted with various policies (static, random, myopic, RL, RL+LLM) which showed a utility-safety trade-off.
  • RL agents improve market utility but can still produce unsafe behavior.
  • When the physics penalty is removed, reward-maximizing agents exploit invalid generation and increase artificial liquidity.
  • The LLM Planner/Auditor improves auditability and mitigates selected risks, but it cannot fully compensate for a misspecified reward function.
  • Results indicate that trustworthy AI evaluation requires physical constraints and transparent intervention traces.
  • Data and code are released as open access on GitHub for replicability.

Key Concepts Mentioned

  • decentralized energy markets
  • agentic AI systems
  • trustworthiness
  • Markov Decision Process
  • Gymnasium-compatible
  • market utility
  • physical safety
  • slippage
  • action smoothness
  • spatial fairness
  • auditability
  • LLM-based Planner/Auditor
  • RL (Reinforcement Learning)
  • LLM (Large Language Model)

Claims Made by the Document

  • SolarChain-Eval can evaluate trustworthy economic agents in decentralized energy markets.
  • RL agents improve market utility but can still produce unsafe behavior.
  • When the physics penalty is removed, reward-maximizing agents exploit invalid generation and increase artificial liquidity.
  • The LLM Planner/Auditor improves auditability and mitigates selected risks.

Evidence Used

  • Formulation of market governance as a Gymnasium-compatible Markov Decision Process.
  • Experiments with various policies and their results.

Methods / Approach

  • Formulating market governance as a Gymnasium-compatible Markov Decision Process
  • Conducting experiments with different policies

Limitations Stated by the Authors

UNKNOWN

Limitations Noted by the Agent

Agent interpretation — not from the source.

UNKNOWN

Open Questions

UNKNOWN

Notes for Future Q&A

May include interpretation. Labeled where it does.

UNKNOWN

Raw Abstract / Excerpt

As agentic AI systems are increasingly applied to cyber-physical environments, their evaluation requires assessment of both task performance and trustworthiness. In decentralized energy markets, autonomous agents may improve market utility, but may also exploit invalid physical data, create artificial liquidity, and produce unstable governance decisions. Therefore, we propose SolarChain-Eval, a physics-constrained benchmark for evaluating trustworthy economic agents. It formulates market governance as a Gymnasium-compatible Markov Decision Process, where agents make hourly decisions. SolarChain-Eval evaluates each policy across multiple dimensions, including market utility, physical safety, slippage, action smoothness, spatial fairness, and auditability. To support agentic evaluation, SolarChain-Eval incorporates an LLM-based Planner/Auditor layer. The Planner defines episode-level action bounds and audit rules, while the Auditor reviews and revises high-risk actions. All interventions are recorded through structured logs, including trigger signals, proposed actions, revised actions, and audit rationales. Experiments with static, random, myopic, RL, and RL+LLM policies reveal a clear utility-safety trade-off. RL agents improve market utility but can still produce unsafe behavior. When the physics penalty is removed, reward-maximizing agents exploit invalid generation and increase artificial liquidity. The LLM Planner/Auditor improves auditability and mitigates selected risks, but it cannot fully compensate for a misspecified reward function. These results indicate that trustworthy agentic AI evaluation requires both physical constraints and transparent intervention traces. We release data and code as open access on GitHub for replicability.